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Exhibit B
HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY
P.O.Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 840 21
(801)728-2435
April 9, 1991
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Position Regarding: K.R. 972, Extending Tribal Court Criminal
Jurisdiction over Non-Tribal Member Indians after Duro v. Reina
Dear Committee Members:
As the elected County Attorney of Duchesne County, Utah, I
wish to express concerns about H.R. 9 72, which extends on a
permanent
basis
tribal
court
criminal
jurisdiction
ever
ncn-tribal member Indians. In Uts Indian Tribe v. State of Utah,
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) , cert, denied 107 S. Ct. 596 (Dec.
1, 1986), the 10th Circuit Court held that nearly all of the land
area and residents of Duchesne County are located within the
exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Curay Indian Reservation of
the Ute Indian Tribe. This issue is still contested and pending
before the Utah Supreme Court. Nevertheless, even under the 10th
Circuit decision, the majority of the land area in our County is
open, non-trust lands and the great majority of the approximately
13,000 people are non-Indian. Only a very small fraction cf cur
county residents are members of the Ute Indian 'Tribe. Other
residents of our community include and/or have included members
of ether tribes; "Mixed Bloods", who are anthropologically of
Indian ancestry, but whose "Indian" status has been terminated by
Federal Law; "and others having Indian blood, but no tribal
membership, with varying degrees of association with or identification with the Ute Indian Community, non-Ute Indians in the
community, and the non-Indian community.
To those who reside on an Indian Reservation without being
members c'f the reservation Tribe, Tribal Court jurisdiction is an
extremely important concern — far too important to be dealt witn
in summary fashion without considering all aspects of the issue.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the full protections of the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights do
not extend in full measure to Indian tribal courts. The Indian
Civil Rights Act, as the tribal courts choose to apply that act,
without review in most cases by either State or Federal Courts,
is the lesser protection. The idea of Congress subjecting any
citizen, whether Indian or non-Indian, to the jurisdiction of a
Court in which his or her constitutional rights do not fully
apply is deeply troubling. We consider this legal situation
dangerous to the civil liberties of both Indian and non-Indian
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citizens of our community and others residing en Indian Reservations.
Inherent Tribal Sovereignty may be sufficient reason to
justify the jurisdiction of an Indian trisal court over memoers
of that tribe. However, it is a different matter for Congress to
reach beyond mnerent sovereignty and deliberately subject United
States Citizens to Courts net governed by tne Bill of Rignts.
Limiting tribal court authority to tribal members is also
the approach wnicn appears most administratively workable on a
practical level in our area.
There is a vast diversity cf
definitions of "Indianhood".
Under the proposed legislation,
tribal courts would appear to be able to extend their jurisdiction by how they choose to define "Indian". This may or may not
cure any void presently existing in jurisdiction, depending upon
whether the tribal court definition of "Indian" for criminal
purposes is the same as the state court definition. In our local
experience/ whera there is a large group of anthropological
Indians wno have had their "Indian" status terminated, and otner
persons wno identify with the Indian Community, sorting out wno
is and who is not subject to tribal and State court authority is
a quagmire. On the contrary, wno is and who is not an enrolled
member of the Ute Indian Tribe would be administratively very
easy to determine.
If any "emergency" action needs to be taken to fill a
jurisdictional void, such action should grant jurisdiction over
non-member Indians to the applicable State Court, at least in tne
case of "open" reservations such as the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Duchesne County stands ready to enforce law and order en
anyone within our County as permitted by State and Federal Law.
Your consideration of this position, and subjecting tnis
matter to further study, rather tnan hastily
subjecting
non-member Indians to tribunals apparently not bound by the full
guarantees of our Constitution, is appreciated.
Sincerely,

Herbert Wm. Gillespie
Duchesne County Attorney
cc:

Clinton S. Peatross, Chairman, Duchesne County Board of
County Commissioners
Paula Smith, Deputy Attorney General, State of Utah
Tom Tobin, Attorney at Law
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN f C^PK
C : x r n * W the Attorney General
Oecannert ot State Counsel
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May 8/ 1991

Senator Daniel Inouye
Chairman, Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs
United States Senate
833 SKOB
Washington, D.C. 20510-6450
RS:

Congressional Response to Dure v. Reina

Dear Senator Inouye:
Enclosed is a Position Paper on Duro v. Reina Issues
submitted on behalf of the Attorneys General of the states of
Utah, Montana, Washington, North Dakota, and South Dakota. We
understand that the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs is
holding a hearing on Thursday, May 9, 1991, on the inpact of the
Duro v. Reina decision and en legislation concerning criminal
]urisaicticn over Indians en Indian reservations. We would like
the attached Position Paper to be made part of the record for
this hearing.
Sincerely,

PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
Enclosure
cc: Committee Members
Senator Dennis DeConcini
Senator Quentin Burdick
Senator Thomas Daschle
Senator Kent Conrad
Senator Harry Reid
Senator Paul Simon
Senator Dan Akaka
Senator Paul Wellstone
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John McCain
Frank Murkowski
Thad Chochran
Slade Gorton
Pete Domenici
Nancy Kassebaum
Don Nickles
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POSITION PAPER ON DURO v. REINA ISSUES
Submitted on Behalf of the Attorneys General of Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Washington, and Utah.
The above listed Attorneys General are concerned about effective law enforcement
on Indian reservations. On many reservations, the majority of the population is made up
of non-Indians. Where reservation residents include non-Indians and Indians, law
enforcement has been split among tribal, state and federal authorities.
Crimes by non-Indians have generally been the responsibility of state and county
law enforcement. Crimes by tribal member Indians have been the responsibility of tribal
or federal authorities, depending on the seriousness of the crime. The maximum
sentence that a tribal court can impose is one year and a $5000 fine. However, some
states have assumed criminal jurisdiction over all reservation residents, including all
Indians, pursuant to congressional authorization m Public Lav/ 280. Non-tnbai member
Indians have been treated as non-Indians in some cases and as tribal-member Indians in
other cases.
In May 1990, the United States Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina that a tribal
court does not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are not members of
that tribe. The Court found that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa tribal court did not have
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute a member of the Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
Indians on a weapons charge. However, the Court did note that federal authorities could
have prosecuted the defendant for murder. In Duro. the United States Supreme Court
stated that a[o]ur cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress
to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not
provide constitutional protections as a matter of right"
The Duro ruling left open the question of the extent of state jurisdiction over crimes
committed on reservations by non-tribal member Indians in non-Public Law 280 states.
States may arguably have criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians because
state jurisdiction would not be preempted by tribal law or, in some cases concerning nonmajor crimes, by federal law.
In August 1990, the Conference of Western Attorneys General adopted a resolution
urging caution in considering emergency legislation to deal with any problems the Duro
case may have created until the case's impact could be assessed. During the last
session of Congress, additions to the Defense Appropriation Bill added language to the
Indian Civil Rights Act that may have the effect of allowing tribal courts to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians for a one-year period ending

f>3C/

236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT L ^ E CITY UTAH 84114 • TEl£f*OsH 901-538-1015 • =AX NO 301 S38-1121

^ 4 *

295
September 30, 1991. H.R. 972 deletes the one-year period limitation on last year's
legislation and other similar legislation may have the same goal.
Preliminary information collected in Western states indicates that the state, federal
and tribal law enforcement resources on non-Pubiic Law 280 Indian reservations differ
greatly. Some reservations have no tribal police or no tribal courts or have such
resources only on a portion of the reservation. On some reservations, federal or state
officials handled law enforcement concerning non-member Indians both before and after
the Puro decision. On other reservations, tribes handled misdemeanor offenses by nontribaf member Indians prior to Ouro and subsequent to the 1990 amendments.
Therefore, one simple response to the Duro decision is likely to be difficult.
The above listed Attorneys General are concerned about the congressional reaction
to the Puro decision as reflected in the 1990 amendments for three reasons. First, those
amendments may have been intended to subject non-tribal member Indians to tribal court
criminal jurisdiction without the protections accorded in the Bill of Rights. The Duro
Court noted that tribal courts are typically governed, not by the Bill of Rights, but by the
lesser requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Duro Court has already
questioned Congress's ability to subject citizens to courts not governed by the Bill of
Rights.
Second, an attempt to retroactively recognize Indian tribes' inherent jurisdiction
conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's definitive conclusion in Duro that Indian
tribes do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians. Third, if
the 1990 amendments are viewed as a congressional delegation of authority and not a
recognition of inherent authority, such an interpretation may create double jeopardy
problems and bar ail federal criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Wheeler.
Because of the many problems created by the 19S0 amendments and tribal
opposition to state criminal jurisdiction over ncn-tribai member Indians, the above-listed
Attorneys General recommend the following;
a. The 1990 amendments should be allowed to lapse and Congress should
explicitly recognize federal criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians by
amending the General Crimes Act as marked on the attached sheet.
b. Any legislation concerning tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal member
Indians should (1) explicitly indicate that the Bill of Rights applies to such tribal court
Jurisdiction; (2) provide for federal jurisdiction where no tribal courts exist; and (3)
provide for tribal court jurisdiction only when federal prosecutors decline to prosecute in
order to avoid double jeopardy problems.
c. States willing to handle criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians
should be expressly allowed to continue to share such jurisdiction with the federal
government.
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One possible version of 18 U.S.C. §1152 is listed below:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, to the extent the alleoed offense was committed by
a member of the tribe for whose benefit, or for whose members1 benefit, the Indian
country in which the crime allegedly occurred was set aside, nor to any Indian committing
an offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of his tribe, or to
any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses Is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
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mnitca States Senate
SELECT C V/M17TEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6450

October 30, 1991

Ms. Edson Gardner
Eox 472
Ft Duch:9^re *TT 2«io?£
Dear Ms. Gardner:
Thank you for your letter regarding support for S. 9 52 and
K.R. 9 72, companion Senate and House measures that would remove
the September 30, 1991 limitation on the effects of a 1990
amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act in which the Congress
reaffirmed the inherent authority of tribal governments to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, as the term
"Indian" is defined for purposes of the federal Major Crimes Act,
x O
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I have consistently made clear my position of full and
strong support for a permanent resolution to the jurisdictional
void created by the Supreme Court's ruling in Duro v. Reina.
Accordingly, I am pleased to report that the President signed
H.R. 972 into law en October 28, 1991. The Public Law number is
102-137.
Thank ycu for taking the time to write to the Committee
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